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THE ARCHITECTURE OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT
AND THE CASE OF WORKPLACE HARASSMENT
Cynthia L. Estlund*
I can think of no better metaphor for Professor Schauer's chief
contribution to free speech methodology than he has, at least on one
occasion, chosen for himself: he has called upon us to consider the
"architecture" of the First Amendment.' It is an apt metaphor that
situates a significant strain of Professor Schauer's work just where
2
legal scholarship can often be most helpful.
Architects design structures in which people live and work. They
are concerned with artistic considerations of beauty, balance, and symmetry. But a great architect does not exalt the aesthetic purity of a
structure over the needs of its future occupants. Architects must also
be concerned, like engineers, with the load-bearing properties and
the durability of materials; they must think about where the heating
ducts and the vents will go. But the architect must fit these details
into a livable and workable whole.
A good deal of First Amendment scholarship can perhaps fairly
be described as more akin to art or to engineering-both noble callings-than to architecture. We might (contentiously) denominate as
"art" those works of free speech theory that are philosophically inspired and guided by norms of conceptual purity and consistency.3
* Leroy G. Denman, Jr., Regents Professor of Law, University of Texas School of
Law. I want to thank Sam Issachasoff and Scot Powe for their comments on an earlier
draft.
1 Frederick Schauer, Commercial Speech and the Architecture of the First Amendment
56 U. CIN. L. REv. 1181 (1988) [hereinafter Schauer, Architecture]. For another exploration-slightly more literal-of the relation of architecture to law, see Daniel A. Farber, The Dead Hand of the Architect, 19 HARv. J.L. & PUB. POL'y 245 (1995).
2 Professor Schauer had the good judgment not to overtax the metaphor of architecture. I risk doing so here.
3 For example, some scholars seek to elucidate the single primary value underlying the freedom of speech and the First Amendment. See, e.g., ALEXANDER
MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH AND ITS RELATION TO SELF-GOVERNMENT 16-17 (1948) (advancing informed democratic self-governance); MARTIN REDISH, FREEDOM OF ExPRESSION: A CRrrlcAL ANALYsIs 47-48 (1984) (advocating self-realization); C. Edwin Baker,
The Scope of the First Amendment Freedom of Speech, 25 UCLA L. REv. 964, 990-1009
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We might then denominate as "engineering" the very large body of
scholarly work that seeks to elucidate one or more of the many partic4
ularized segments of First Amendment doctrine.
But much of Professor Schauer's free speech scholarship is a
model of a different sort. His work systematically directs our attention
to the overall design and structure of free speech law, and to the ways
in which particular doctrines affect that overall structure, in light of
the strengths and weaknesses of the actors and institutions that live
and work within it. In his words:
We would hardly think it appropriate to design a building by deciding beam by beam, pillar by pillar, and brick by brick, as we went
along, what the building was to look like. Instead the building's
structural integrity depends on a design at the beginning, a design
that looks to the full shape of the completed structure.
Naturally, common law development, as apt a characterization as
any for what the courts do with respect to the first amendment, cannot design the edifice in advance. Nevertheless, it can, and should,
consider at each turn what a proposed incremental change will do
to the structure as a whole, and consider at each turn whether a
particular doctrinal expansion that seems inconsequential when
taken in isolation, would, if matched by equivalently inconsequential expansions in different directions, or at different times in the
future, in the aggregate so alter the shape of the edifice that it
might lose its structural integrity. 5

(1978) (stressing personal liberty); David Richards, Free Speech and Obscenity Law: Toward a Moral Theory of the FirstAmendment, 123 U. PA. L. REV.45, 83-90 (1974) (discussing equal liberty); Timothy Scanlon, A Theory of Freedom of Expression, 1 PHIL. & PUB.
AFF. 204 (1972) (promoting individual autonomy in decisionmaking).
Professor Schauer is a major "artist" of the First Amendment. See FREDERICK
SCHAUER, FREE SPEECH: A PHILOSOPHICAL ENQUIRY (1982) [hereinafter SCHAUER,FREE
SPEECH]. But he has been skeptical of the many attempts to reduce the justification
for free speech to a single "core value." Id. at 13-14; Schauer, Architecture, supra note
1, at 1185-86. He has also explained why the extraction of one or more core values
underlying the freedom of speech does not enable us to decide cases directly in accordance with those core values. See Frederick Schauer, The Second-Best First Amendment, 31 WM. & MARY L. REV.1 (1989). Rather, we need "rules" that will necessarily be
both underinclusive and overinclusive in relation to the values underlying those rules.
Id. Architects enter to design the rules, and the system of rules, that protect free
speech values.
4 Examples of this sort of work-some of it excellent-abound. Most of the articles cited infra notes 9-11 would be examples of First Amendment "engineering" as
defined here.
5 Schauer, Architecture, supra note 1, at 1202.
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Professor Schauer thus urges us, as we take up any particular question
of free speech doctrine, to aim for a sound and usable First Amendment, one in which "form follows function."
Professor Schauer once wrote, in commenting on John Hart Ely's
work, that " [w] e honor the enduring nature of Ely's contributions ... not by retreading familiar ground, but rather, by continuously finding new uses for those contributions." 6 That is what I
propose to do here, briefly, with what I have found to be some of
Professor Schauer's most helpful contributions in the arena of free
speech theory and doctrine-that is, his systematic attention to how
these doctrines fit into the overall structure of the First Amendment.
There is a lively debate within First Amendment scholarship over
the constitutional status of discriminatory verbal harassment, particularly in the workplace. 7 A number of decisions finding harassment
liability under Title VII have turned in whole or in part on what we
would ordinarily recognize as "speech"; yet few courts have seriously
considered the relevance of the First Amendment in this regard.8 The
commentators have stepped into the judicial vacuum with gusto.
Some commentators have argued that Title VII's harassment law, as
applied to nearly all speech, abridges the freedom of speech protected by the First Amendment.9 Others have defended harassment
law as both necessary to workplace equality and entirely consistent
with free speech principles and doctrine.' 0 Still others situate them6 Frederick Schauer, The Calculus of Distrust, 77 VA. L. REv. 653, 654 (1991).
7 For my own contribution to this debate, summarized very briefly below, infra
note 87, see Cynthia L. Esdund, Freedom ofExpression in the Workplace and the Problem of
DiscriminatoryHarassment, 75 TEx. L. REv. 687 (1997). What follows is taken in part
from that more extended treatment of the subject. But part of that article, in turn,

was a product of my close attention, stimulated by the present occasion, to the
Schaueresque principles of First Amendment architecture.
8 There are exceptions. See, e.g., DeAngelis v. El Paso Mun. Police Officers Ass'n,
51 F.3d 591, 596 (5th Cir. 1995) (suggesting in dicta the possibility of a First Amendment defense to a harassment claim based on "pure expression" in the form of news-

letter columns following the court's rejection of the harassment claim on statutory
grounds); Robinson v. Jacksonville Shipyards, Inc., 760 F. Supp. 1486, 1534-37 (M.D.

Fla. 1991) (considering and rejecting a First Amendment defense to an injunction
against verbal and graphic sexual materials as a remedy for sexual harassment);
Meltebeke v. Bureau of Labor & Indus., 903 P.2d 351, 355 (Or. 1995) (mentioning a
limited First Amendment defense against religious harassment claims).

9 Professor Browne stakes out one end of the spectrum, arguing that virtually all
regulation of verbal harassment violates the First Amendment. See Kingsley R.
Browne, Workplace Censorship: A Response to ProfessorSangree, 47 RUTGERS L. REV. 579,
580-82 (1995).
10 See, e.g., CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, ONLY WoRDs 45-68 (1993); Mary Becker,
How Free Is Speech at Work?, 29 U.C. DAvis L. REv. 815 (1996).

1364

NOTRE

DAME LAW

REVIEW

[VOL.

72:5

selves at some point in the middle and advocate some restrictions on
the application of Title VII to speech."'
While the workplace context puts a unique spin on the issue, the
problem of discriminatory harassment raises many of the classic architectural problems that Professor Schauer urges us to consider: does it
make sense to think of discriminatory harassment (or the incidents
that may contribute to a hostile environment) as "speech"-as conduct to which the First Amendment is relevant? What will it do to First
Amendment doctrine as a whole to include within its purview, or to
exclude from it, some of what might be discriminatory harassment?
Does all or most of what may contribute to a harassment claim fit into
one or more of the existing categories of unprotected speech? If not,
should we afford "full protection" to this speech, or should we instead
recognize a new category of unprotected or less protected speech?
How might we define such a category so as to minimize the dangers of
both errors of application and of further fragmentation and excessive
complexity within the structure of free speech law?
I propose to take up some of these questions briefly here as a way
of testing the usefulness of, and, frankly, paying homage to, some of
Professor Schauer's contributions in the free speech arena.

I
One form of employment discrimination prohibited by Title VII
is the creation of an abusive or hostile work environment through discriminatory harassment. As the Supreme Court recently reaffirmed in
Harrisv. Forklift Systems, Inc., 12 to establish a Title VII violation, an employee must show that "the workplace is permeated with 'discriminatory intimidation, ridicule, and insult,' that is 'sufficiently severe or
pervasive to alter the conditions of the victim's employment and create an abusive working environment."'" 3
11

See, e.g.,

KENT GREENAWALT, FIGHTING WORDS: INDIVIDUALS, COMMUNITIES, AND

LIBERTES OF SPEECH 77-96 (1995); Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Sexual Harassment, Content

Neutrality, and the First Amendment Dog That Didn't Bark, 1994 Sup. CT. REV. 1, 40-41;
Marcy Strauss, Sexist Speech in the Workplace, 25 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 1, 49, 49-51
(1990); Nadine Strossen, Regulating Workplace Sexual Harassmentand Upholding the First
Amendment-Avoiding a Collision, 37 VL. L. REV. 757, 782 (1992); Eugene Volokh,
How Harassment Law RestrictsFree Speech, 47 RUTGERS LJ. 563, 576 (1995) [hereinafter
Volokh, How HarassmentLaw]; Eugene Volokh, Comment, Freedom of Speech and Workplace Harassment, 39 UCLA L. REV. 1791, 1863-67 (1992) [hereinafter Volokh, Comment]. This middle group itself encompasses widely varying stances.
12 510 U.S. 17 (1993).
13 Id. at 21 (quoting Meritor Savings Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 65
(1986)).
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Workplace harassment law seeks to induce employers, largely
through the threat of liability, to institute and enforce policies prohibiting forms of discriminatory harassment that burden the worklives of
and hinder the advancement of women and minorities in some workplaces. Yet the law's transformative objective, and its partial success,
has been accompanied by emerging concerns about freedom of
speech. 14 For some of the workplace conduct that can contribute to
harassment liability consists of speech: the display of pornography, use
of offensive epithets, statements of hostility or condescension toward
women or minorities in the occupation or the workplace, or other
15
verbal or graphic expression.
Consider Harris itself. As the Supreme Court summarized the
findings below, much of the complained-of harassment was verbal:
[Tlhroughout Harris' time at Forklift, Hardy [the company president] often insulted her because of her gender and often made her
the target of unwanted sexual innuendos. Hardy told Harris on several occasions, in the presence of other employees, 'You're a woman, what do you know" and 'We need a man as the rental
manager"; at least once, he told her she was "a dumb ass woman."
Again in front of others, he suggested that the two of them "go to
the Holiday Inn to negotiate [Harris'] raise." Hardy occasionally
asked Harris and other female employees to get coins from his front
pants pocket. He threw objects on the ground in front of Harris
and other women, and asked them to pick the objects up. He made
sexual innuendos about Harris' and other women's clothing.
[After Harris complained and Hardy promised to stop,] Hardy began anew: While Harris was arranging a deal with one of Forklift's
customers, he asked her, again in front of other employees, "What
16
did you do, promise the guy... some [sex] Saturday night?"
Most of the offending conduct in the case was "speech" by any ordinary language definition.' 7 At least some of the speech was of a sort
that the state could not freely prohibit on the basis of its content if it
took place outside the workplace: "sexual innuendos," the statement
that "[w] e need a man as the rental manager,"' 8 even some of the
taunts, however offensive, do not appear to fall into any of the estab14 See supra notes 7-11 and accompanying text.
15 For a further description of some of this case law, see Volokh, Comment, supra
note 11.
16 Harris,510 U.S. at 18-19.
17 That does not, of course, mean that these utterances are protected or even
necessarily covered by the First Amendment. See Frederick Schauer, Categories and the
First Amendment: A Play in Three Acts, 34 VAND. L. REv. 265, 269-272 (1981) [hereinafter Schauer, Categories].

18 See infra note 36 and accompanying text.

1366

NOTRE

DAME LAW

REVIEW

[VOL- 72:5

lished categories of wholly unprotected speech. Yet Title VII makes
this speech actionable as part of a hostile environment claim.1 9 Indeed, it does so on the basis of the content, and at least arguably the
viewpoint expressed; such applications of Title VII thus seem to raise a
difficult constitutional issue.
The constitutional concerns were raised by the defendant and
briefed by both parties in Harrisitself (though not in the court below); yet they were not mentioned in the Harrisopinions. Professor
Fallon aptly describes Harrisas "the jurisprudential equivalent of the
dog that didn't bark-a clue (but no more than that) to some of the
First Amendment mysteries surrounding prohibition of sexually
20
harassing speech."
We have here a very nice problem in First Amendment law: does
the First Amendment limit the scope of workplace harassment law? If
so, how shall we define the nature of those First Amendment limitations? Should we recognize a category of unprotected or less protected speech-"discriminatory workplace harassment" (or perhaps
more broadly, discriminatory harassment) -that goes beyond existing
categories of unprotected or less protected speech?
The problem is one that can profitably be confronted in stages.
Here we get a good deal of guidance from Professor Schauer. Once
we have a handle on what sort of speech we are talking about, we have
to ask first whether this conduct-the various acts and incidents that
contribute to the creation of a discriminatory hostile environmentshould be treated as "speech" within the meaning of the First Amendment at all. If so, then we should ask whether it should be entitled to
the very high level of protection that prevails at the core of freedom of
speech, or rather whether it should be relegated to the fringes by
some further process of subcategorization. Finally, if we do decide to
accord less protection to some subcategory of workplace harassment,
how do we define that category and what rules or standards should
define the scope of protection or permissible suppression?
19 Title VII's harassment doctrine, of course, imposes liability on employers for failing to prevent or punish what is typically employee speech and conduct that creates a
hostile work environment. This mismatch between the speaker and the liable party
may account, more than anything, for the lack of judicial attention to the potential
free speech issues. But on reflection it seems quite clear that the First Amendment

must reach a law that deliberately seeks to force private employers, under threat of
liability, to act as its agents for the purpose of speech suppression and punishment.
See Volokh, How Harassment Law, supra note 11. This does not answer the question

whether there is an actual conflict between the First Amendment and Title VII, but it
does require us to confront the question head on.
20 Fallon, supra note 11, at 2.
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Each of these questions turns out to be quite complicated, and I
do not propose to provide a definitive answer here. But I want to see
how much progress we might be able to make by following the architectural guidelines supplied by Professor Schauer in some of his First
Amendment writings.
II
We need to define our terms before proceeding further. Let us
use the term "verbal workplace harassment" to encompass speech that
allegedly contributes to a hostile and discriminatory workplace environment. I say "allegedly" because we are aiming for a potential limitation on what acts judges may consider, and how such acts will be
21
treated, as part of a harassment complaint.
The term "verbal workplace harassment" tends to obscure two
troublesome features of this sort of speech. The first problem is that
the term tends to imply that each separate act or statement either is or
isn't "harassment." In fact each act or utterance in a harassment complaint may not itself constitute actionable harassment; it is generally
an accumulation of episodes that adds up to a hostile environment.
The totality of episodes could rarely be defended on free speech
grounds. But that is not a basis for deflecting First Amendment concerns, for the statute intentionally induces liability-averse employers to
suppress individual acts that might contributeto liability. 22 So the question ought to be whether some of the speech that employers are reasonably induced to ban or punish should be constitutionally
protected. Let us use the term "verbal workplace harassment" to describe such speech.
The term may also obscure the extraordinary variety of speech it
encompasses, including threats of sexual assault, sexual propositions,
sexual innuendo and banter, profanity, racist and sexist epithets, displays of pornography, and statements disapproving of or disparaging
women or minorities and their presence in the workplace, trade, or
profession. But this variety does not disable us from considering verbal workplace harassment as a class of speech in the first instance; it
23
simply warns us of complications down the road.
21

I am ignoring for present purposes the reasons for this aim.

22

See Volokh, How HarassmentLaw, supra note 11.

23 Similar complications arise as to "commercial speech," which is also a very diverse category. See Schauer, Architecture, supra note 1, at 1183; see also Steven Shiffrin,
The First Amendment and Economic Regulation: Away from a General Theoy of the First
Amendment, 78 Nw. U. L. REv. 1212, 1213-14 (1983).

1368

NOTRE

DAME

LAW REVIEW[

[VOL- 72:5

While cognizant of these complications, I will use the term "verbal workplace harassment" to stand for workplace speech that allegedly contributes to a discriminatory hostile environment.
III
The first question is whether verbal workplace harassment is
"speech" within the meaning of the First Amendment. To say that
speech is "speech"-that it is covered by the First Amendment-is not
to conclude that it is protected. We are simply asking whether verbal
workplace harassment-or, more precisely, some verbal workplace harassment-is the sort of conduct to which the First Amendment is
relevant.
The problem here parallels in many ways the problems posed by
defamation law before New York Times Co. v. Sullivan 4 and by commercial law before Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc.2 5 Here as there, the conventional answer that the
courts have supplied-in the case of Title VII, mainly by default-is
that the First Amendment has nothing to do with workplace harassment complaints. Here as there, that answer is supported by the
fact-which I will simply assert here-that most of what is included in
26
the category at issue lies far from the core or cores of free speech.
Here as there, this resolution gives the state greater power to advance
certain important interests-here, workplace equality. Yet here as
there, at least some of what is at issue is clearly communicative in nature. Is it "speech" in the constitutional sense?
As Professor Schauer and others have pointed out, this question
cannot be answered by consulting a dictionary.2 7 The statement,
"Give me your wallet or I'll kill you," or more to the point, "Have sex
with me or I'll fire you," is obviously speech in the dictionary sense,
and almost equally obviously not "speech" in the First Amendment
sense. 28 Threats, criminal solicitation and conspiracy, perjury, fraud,
blackmail, and extortion, for example, generally consist entirely of
speech in the dictionary sense, yet lie outside the realm of the First
Amendment. Similarly, commercial contracts, corporate proxy solici24 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
25 425 U.S. 748 (1976).
26 See Schauer, Architecture, supra note 1, 1185-86. For a more extended treatment of this question, see Estlund, supra note 7.
27 See Schauer, Categories, supra note 17, at 268-73.
28 That is not to say that the First Amendment does not stand guard against an
attempt to expand the normal definition of threats to reach protected speech. See,
e.g., Rankin v. McPherson, 483 U.S. 378 (1987).

19971

FIRST AMENDMENT

ARCHITECTURE

1369

tations, agreements in restraint of trade, and the rendering of professional advice are wholly verbal, yet are subject to regulation as
commercial activity free from the constraints of the First Amendment. 29 Like the more contested categories of "unprotected speech,"
such as "obscenity" and "fighting words," they are constitutionally
equivalent to "nonspeech."
This first-level categorization might allow us to narrow our inquiry. Some verbal workplace harassment takes the form of fighting
words, obscenity, threats of assault or other illegal action, intentional
infliction of emotional distress, offers of favorable job treatment or
threats of adverse treatment to extract sexual compliance, and sexual

29 Only some of this "nonspeech speech" is generally described as corresponding
to an "exception" to the First Amendment. The language of "exception" fits only
when some litigant or defendant has the creativity or the audacity to invoke the First
Amendment where it has not been thought to play any role, and where some court
takes the argument seriously enough to explicitly reject it. But once the issue of First
Amendment coverage of some new class of communicative conduct is on the table, it
ought rightly to be taken up in the form of an argument for or against an "exception"
or an exclusion from the realm of coverage. We ought, in other words, to follow a
"defining out" approach to the scope of the First Amendment, which proceeds from
the "outside in": where speech falls within some broad definition of communicative
conduct, the question is whether there is an adequate basis for excluding it from First
Amendment coverage. Or so Professor Schauer argued in earlier days. See Schauer,
Categories, supra note 17, at 279-82.
More recently Professor Schauer has expressed skepticism toward the notion that
speech is generally covered by the First Amendment, and that non-coverage is the
exception. See Frederick Schauer, The Speech of Law and the Law of Speech, 49 ARK. L.
REv. 687, 696-97 (1997). It is true that, once we recoguize just how much verbiage
lies wholly outside the realm of the First Amendment, we might be tempted to conclude that the First Amendment itself creates only a rather narrow exception to the
general power of the state to regulate and punish speech on the same terms as other
conduct. Id. It is also true that some arguments for recognizing an exception to the
First Amendment can be understood equally well as arguments for a narrower definition of the category of speech that is covered by the First Amendment in the first
place. See Frederick Schauer, Exceptions, 58 U. CHI. L. REv. 871 (1991) [hereinafter
Schauer, Exceptions]; see also infranote 41. These insights might send us down a different road, toward an attempt to define the scope of the First Amendment from the
"inside out": what qualifies communicative conduct for special protection? Yet one of
Professor Schauer's important contributions to free speech methodology, in my view,
is his explication of the superior virtues of the "defining out" approach to the scope
of the First Amendment. I thus take Professor Schauer's apparent inversion of this
formulation as a recognition of the possibility of proceeding from the inside out-a
possibility that the deconstructionist trend has perhaps made more salient-but not
as a repudiation of the architectural virtues of proceeding from the outside in.
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propositions. Such conduct, while verbal in nature, is conventionally
30
excluded from the realm of free speech entirely.
The exclusion of certain utterances from the category of "speech"
obviously allows for the advancement of competing values and interests-here, interests in economic equality and freedom from workplace discrimination-that are threatened by those utterances. But
Professor Schauer would have us attend as well to the ways in which it
also serves First Amendment values to exclude some utterances from
the scope of the First Amendment entirely. The key to this rather
paradoxical proposition lies in the dilemma that awaits us down the
road if we decide that worthless and harmful utterances such as
threats of violence and "fighting words" are within the scope of the
First Amendment: shall we extend the very strict protections that apply at the core of free speech, and court the risk of "doctrinal dilution"?31 Or shall we create a separate subcategory for the speech at
issue, and contribute to a process of doctrinal fragmentation that
poses structural threats of its own? 32 I want to return to these questions, after taking note of a problem with the distinction between First
Amendment coverage and First Amendment protection. The prob33
lem is R.A.V. v. St. Paul.
In R.A.V the Court unanimously struck down a municipal hate
speech ordinance that had been construed by the state court to reach
only "fighting words." Even though the ordinance reached only
speech that was "unprotected," it was held to be unconstitutional because it distinguished among unprotected utterances on the basis of
the viewpoint they expressed. R.A. V thus affords some First Amendment protection to "unprotected" speech and complicates the very
first step of our architectural analysis.
The significance of R.A. V for harassment law is a matter of some
complexity. RA. V clearly signified that the First Amendment was relevant to harassment law; indeed, its reasoning threatened to vitiate
harassment law as applied to verbal harassment. For even if Title VII
were construed to reach only "unprotected" speech and physical conduct, like the St. Paul ordinance, it would ban only the unprotected
speech that expressed contempt or bias toward an employee on the
basis of her race, sex, ethnicity, or religion. The majority, apparently
unwilling to take on the burden of invalidating much of workplace

30 That conventional proposition must be qualified after the decision in RA.V. v.
City of St. Paul 505 U.S. 377 (1992). See infra notes 33-36 and accompanying text.
31 See infra notes 64-72 and accompanying text.
32
33

See infra notes 55-63 and accompanying text.
505 U.S. 377 (1992).
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harassment law, sought to reassure its proponents that R.A.V did not
sound the deathknell of harassment law:
[S]ince words can in some circumstances violate laws directed not
against speech but against conduct... , a particular content-based
subcategory of a proscribable class of speech can be swept up incidentally within the reach of a statute directed at conduct rather
than speech ....Thus, for example, sexually derogatory "fighting

words," among other words, may produce a violation of Title VII's
general prohibition against sexual discrimination in employment
34
practices.
The grounds upon which the majority distinguished Title VII from
the St. Paul ordinance raised questions of its own, to which I will return below.3 5
But this purported vindication of harassment doctrine also
threatened to drastically limit the scope of the doctrine by restricting
it to the narrow conventional categories of "unprotected" speech and
conduct. For much of what is part of a typical harassment complaint-i.e., most sexual innuendo, profanity, racist and sexist epithets, the display of non-obscene pornography, and disparagement of
women or minorities and their presence in the workplace, trade, or
profession-falls outside the conventional categories of non-speech
speech.a 6 If the RA.V dictum were the last word on the constitu34 Id. at 389 (citations omitted).
35 See infra notes 68-70 and accompanying text.
36 That should not be surprising. For good architectural reasons, the unprotected categories are quite tightly circumscribed, and the nature of the categories
place the "burden of proof' on those seeking to deny protection. See, e.g., Hustler
Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 53-56 (1988) (noting the traditional definition
of intentional infliction of emotional distress as outrageous statements that are intended to inflict emotional distress and that actually cause emotional distress, but
adding the additional requirement of actual malice in the case of public figures);
NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886 (1982) (defining unprotected
threats of violence or unlawful activity as distinct from threats of "social disapproval"
or ostracism so as not to swallow up protection of picketing in support of civil rights
boycott); Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973) (defining unprotected obscenity
by three-part test: "(a) whether 'the average person, applying contemporary community standards' would find that the work, taken as a whole, appeals to the prurient
interest... ; (b) whether the work depicts or describes, in a patently offensive way,
sexual conduct specifically defined by the applicable state law; and (c) whether the
work, taken as a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value."
(citations omitted)); Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S. 518, 524 (1972) (implying that
fighting words-defined in Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire,315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942), as
words "which by their very utterance inflict injury or tend to incite an immediate
breach of the peace"--must be directed at a particular individual to be unprotected).
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tional status of verbal workplace harassment, it would drastically
change the face of harassment law.
There is good reason to believe that R.A.V. is not the last word,
however, because much of what was at issue in Harrisv. Forklift Industries,37 decided one term later, fell well outside the boundaries suggested by RA. V Harris seems to suggest that some broader class of
verbal workplace harassment-not limited to the traditional unprotected categories of speech-is subject to either less First Amendment
protection or none.3 8 So we are back to the first step in our architectural analysis: should verbal workplace harassment be excluded from
the realm of constitutional "speech"?
This formulation of the question presupposes an important structural feature of First Amendment doctrine. In defining the coverage
of the First Amendment-the meaning of "speech"-we are generally
committed to what Professor Schauer has called the "defining out"
approach: once an act falls within some very broad class of communicative conduct, it is presumptively "speech" unless we can justify its
exclusion.3 9 This is in contrast to a "defining in" approach, in which
we would start from the core values of freedom of speech and design a
category of coverage that advances those values. As Professor Schauer
explains:
In a perfect world the "defining in" and "defining out" methods
would yield identical results.... The world, however, is not perfect.
Human beings make mistakes, and the entire apparatus of presumption and burden of proof, in any area of law, is designed to
reflect an ordering of values in an imperfect world. When we use
presumptions and allocate the burden of proof, we attempt to ensure that decisions under uncertainty will be biased away from restriction of those values we hold to be of greatest importance....
of underinclusion by defining out
[W]e can avoid more 4errors
0
rather than defining in.

The "defining out" approach thus reflects a substantive constitutional
commitment: "When the first amendment is at issue, the dangers of

37 510 U.S. 17 (1993).
38 Harrismust be read with caution on this point. All the Court held was that the
courts below had erred in holding that plaintiff must establish serious emotional distress in order to make out a hostile environment claim. Based on this holding, the
Court remanded for further proceedings on the merits. The Court did not hold that
the facts were sufficient to establish a hostile environment.
39 Schauer, Categories, supra note 17, at 279-81.
40 Id. at 280-81.
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mistaken exclusion from the first amendment must be considered to
'4 1
be greater than the dangers of mistaken inclusion.
Under the "defining out" approach, then, we should ask not why
verbal workplace harassment (that part of it that lies outside the existing categories of nonspeech) should be covered, but why should it

41 Schauer, Architecture, supra note 1, at 1190. I am not sure whether Professor
Schauer remains committed to this view. In Schauer, Exceptions, supra note 29, he
maintains that some arguments for creating an exception to the First Amendment
can be understood equally as arguments for a narrower primary definition of the
category of covered or protected speech. For example, Justice Rehnquist's dissenting
opinion in Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989), can be seen as an argument for
defining political speech as something like "political speech other than flag burning"
rather than an argument for an exception from the protection of political speech.
Schauer, Exceptions, supra note 29, at 882. Similarly, arguments for the unprotected
status of racist hate speech and some pornography, such as that embodied in the
Indianapolis anti-pornography ordinance, can be seen not as arguments for exceptions to the protections against viewpoint discrimination but as arguments for redefining the primary category as "viewpoints other than the viewpoint that women are
appropriate objects of sexual violence." Id. at 890. In either case, the lack of an economical term for the proposed narrower category "merely reflect[s] the contingent
linguistic and categorical apparatus with which we view" such laws. Id. at 898; see also
Frederick Schauer, FreeSpeech and the CulturalContingeny of ConstitutionalCategories,14
CARozo L. REv. 865 (1993).
Perhaps this represents no substantive shift, for Professor Schauer does not appear to hold that the burden of justifying the narrowing of the primary category
should be any lower than the burden ofjustifying an exception to the primary category. He says, "[n ]ow that we know that exceptions are continuous with the rules they
are exceptions to, however contingent that continuity may be, we can see that there is
no difference between adding an exception to a rule and simply changing it."
Schauer, Exceptions, supra note 29, at 893. Either move, I take it, must be justified by
its proponents.
On the other hand, I detect a shift in emphasis and tone. In Schauer, Categories,
supra note 17, at 281, the choice of a "defining out" approach, under which the primary definition of "speech" is broad, and exceptions must be strictly justified, was a
crucial and salutory device for operationalizing our substantive commitment to freedom of expression. In Exceptions, however, it is the "archetypal First Amendment libertarian," a term that does not connote praise, who, "recognizing that the power to
make exceptions is the power to change the rule, is wary of exceptions, although
commonly unaware of the contingency of the linguistic and categorical underpinnings upon which this suspicion rests." Schauer, Exceptions, supra note 29, at 898. Of
course, to be aware of the contingency of our categories of thought and legal analysis
is not necessarily to reject them or even to question their functionality. I think Professor Schauer continues to believe that the nature of our legal and linguistic categories,
however culturally contingent, may be important determinants of the "ruleness of a
rule" and, in the case of the First Amendment, of the strength, soundness, and durability of constitutional protections of free speech.
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not be covered? 42 We ask not whether this speech makes an affirmative contribution to the values underlying the First Amendment, but,
to paraphrase the Supreme Court, "whether speech [that may contribute to a hostile workplace environment] ...is so removed from any
'exposition of ideas, . . and from "'truth, science, morality, and arts
in general, in its diffusion of liberal sentiments on the administration
of Government,"' . . that it lacks all protection." 43 So as we consider
whether verbal workplace harassment is within the coverage of the First
Amendment, we should put the burden ofjustification on the proponents of exclusion.
But Professor Schauer reminds us that the proponent of exclusion has "architectural" principles of her own to draw upon in dealing
with a class of speech like verbal workplace harassment, most of which
is far from the central concerns of the First Amendment. For we do
44
not always strengthen the First Amendment by enlarging its scope.
Keeping this speech out of the realm of First Amendment consideration has the potential virtue of reducing clutter and complexity within
the First Amendment house; for once we let workplace harassment
into the house, there seems little doubt that we will have to build a
separate room for it at the end of the hall. 45 The problem is not
merely aesthetic; it is structural. A First Amendment that is complicated and cluttered may be a weaker and less effective shelter.
Further recommending the simple solution of exclusion is the
relative ease with which the category of verbal workplace harassment
can be identified, contained, and insulated from at least the core of
discourse about public issues in the public forum. 46 Such speech is
found, first of all, in the workplace; and it is normally identifiable, like
defamation, by its inclusion in a particular kind of lawsuit.4 7 The fact
42 The difference between these approaches is most apparent at the margins: the
status of commercial speech, for example, may turn on whether we look to the proponents of inclusion or to the proponents of exclusion to carry the burden ofjustification. Schauer, Categories, supra note 17, at 281.
43 Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc.,
425 U.S. 748, 762 (1976) (citations omitted).
44 See Schauer, Architecture, supra note 1, at 1194-95.
45 See infra notes 54-76 and accompanying text.
46 I agree with Professor Schauer that there is more than one "core" of freedom
of speech and that there is no need to identify only one such core. See SCHAUER, FRE
SPEECH, supra note 3, at 13-14. But all extant theories of free speech would protect
discourse about public issues in the public forum.
47 In the private sector workplace, verbal harassment is a matter of First Amendment concern only where it is subject to state action in the form of Title VII. (Employer suppression of harassment or other offensive speech does not itself raise a
constitutional issue except to the extent that it is the product of reasonable efforts to
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that an individual complainant and not the government initially identifies the speech and seeks a legal remedy against it makes the legal
remedy less akin to censorship, and removes it one step, along a different dimension, from the very most central concerns of the First
Amendment. Still, the fact that we could identify a reasonably discrete
category of utterances and exclude them from the realm of "speech"
does not mean that we should do so.
The workplace context of alleged harassment is an obvious starting point for the proponent of exclusion. Does the workplace context
of speech give us reason to deny that it is "speech" in the constitutional sense? As a general proposition, that is not only inconsistent
with current doctrine (under which workplace speech is clearly less
protected but not unprotected against government suppression and
punishment),48 but entirely implausible. To test this claim, we need

only imagine a law that prohibited all employees, while at work, from
discussing politics. While the example may seem farfetched, it makes
the point quite well: to wholly exclude workplace speech from the
realm of the First Amendment would immeasurably impoverish the
freedom of expression in this society. For many people, there is no
other time or place in their lives in which they can talk about public
issues, personal problems, and spiritual concerns with individuals
from diverse backgrounds and perspectives. 49
But the argument for excluding workplace harassment from the
realm of free speech could take another form. It might be argued
that all speech that contributes to a hostile workplace environment is
itself employment discrimination; that it is equivalent to a "keep out"
sign at the workplace door. 50 The claim is that speech is not "speech"
if it has the same harmful consequence as does some unprotected
avoid liability.) That makes "verbal workplace harassment" easily identifiable in the
same sense in which defamation is easily identifiable. See Schauer, Categories, supra
note 17, at 291 & n.123. And just as in the case of defamation, the identification of
verbal workplace harassment becomes more difficult and more problematic where
the state regulates it directly, rather than through the medium of a private cause of
action, as it does in the public sector workplace. d. at 291 & n.123. I want to put
aside this more difficult question for present purposes, but I deal with it in Estlund,
supra note 7, at 759-62.
48 See Estlund, supra note 7, at 708-10.
49 This proposition is developed at length in Estlund, supranote 7. Here I simply
assert it.
50 See, e.g.,
MACKNNON, supra note 10, at 45-68; Becker, supra note 10, at 849-50
(arguing that verbal sexual harassment of women is discrimination because it gives
men an effective tool for managing the economic competition created by women's
entry into the workforce); Linda S. Greene, Sexual HarassmentLaw and the FirstAmendment, 71 CHi.-KEI'rr L. REv.729, 730 (1995); cf.Strauss, supra note 11, at 15 (suggesting
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conduct, and that regulation of speech does not implicate the First
Amendment if it regulates speech for what it does rather than for what
it says.

This argument essentially extends the RA.V. dicta beyond the
confines of ordinarily unprotected speech to encompass all utterances
that might contribute to a discriminatory hostile environment. I believe that this sort of argument potentially threatens the core of freedom of speech. 5 1 By similar reasoning one might punish an anti-war
speech to a group of prospective army enlistees under a law prohibiting "interference with military recruitment." In the context of workplace harassment, the argument is particularly unsatisfactory with
respect to the small subset of alleged verbal workplace harassment
that constitutes speech on public issues. 5 2 The small but growing
number of harassment complaints, lawsuits, andjudgments that target
political, social, and religious commentary has embarrassed and probably doomed efforts to ignore or deny the existence of a First Amendment issue in workplace harassment law.
Complete exclusion of verbal workplace harassment from the
realm of the First Amendment thus runs into objections similar to
those that eventually prevailed in the areas of commercial speech and
defamation: some of what the category contains, and some of what the
law suppresses, is speech that matters-speech that "has some of the
value that it is the purpose of the first amendment to protect. '5 3 In
the case of workplace harassment, as in the cases of defamation and
commercial speech, the simple solution of exclusion ultimately looks
a bit too simple when we consider some of what the category encompasses. Here as in those cases, complete exclusion seems to sacrifice
some speech that should be protected; the First Amendment enjoins
us, at a minimum, to be very concerned about this sort of underprotection. Let us provisionally admit "verbal workplace harassment" into
the realm of the First Amendment, and proceed to the next step of
our analysis.
IV
Once we decide the question of coverage, we must consider the
question of protection. Should we incorporate verbal workplace harthat some sexist speech should be regulated "not because of the ideology it espouses,
but because it in fact discriminates").
51 See GREENAWALT, supra note 11, at 84-85, 91-92.

52

For a catalog of examples, see Eugene Volokh, What Speech Does "Hostile Work

Environment"HarassmentLaw Restrict?, 85 GEO. L.J. NEED FuLL CITE 53

NOT IN LIBRARY.

Schauer, Architecture, supra note 1, at 1193 (referring to commercial speech).
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assment into the core of highly-protected speech or should we place it
into a separate and less-protected subcategory of "speech"? And if we
decide to recognize a subcategory of verbal workplace harassment,
what rules should determine what speech is protected within that
category?
The first question, in architectural terms, is whether to build a
separate room for verbal workplace harassment, or rather to expand
the central room that contains the core (or cores) of protected
speech. This question, in turn, raises two sets of architectural concerns-concerns about the effect of this discrete doctrinal decision on
the structure and strength of First Amendment law as a whole-that
tend to cut in opposite directions. On the one hand are various dangers associated with the creation of subcategories within the First
Amendment. On the other hand is the danger of "doctrinal dilution"-"the possibility that some existing first amendment rule would
lose some of its strength because of the number of unacceptable applications it would generate when its new applications were added."54
Subcategorization follows from the rational impulse to treat different cases-or different kinds of speech-differently. 55 But Professor Schauer has stressed that the First Amendment can be said to
afford special protection of speech only to the extent that it bars the
56
use of many distinctions that would seem rational and justifiable.
The First Amendment, in a very profound sense, enjoins us to afford
similar treatment to sharply dissimilar utterances. The creation of
subcategories within the realm of the First Amendment tends to erode
that commitment, and, furthermore, to "legitimat[e] the process of
extreme subdivision." 57 Decisions to afford less protection to some
"speech" must therefore meet a higher burden of justification than
58
would ordinary regulation.
Subcategorization also contributes to the increasing complexity
of First Amendment doctrine: "[i] ncreased complexity increases the
likelihood of mistakes" by courts and other officials charged with enforcing the law; and "first amendment mistakes are likely to be systematically skewed" against protection because of "a combination of
unattractive litigants and unsympathetic utterances." 59 Complexity
54 Id. at 1194.
55 See Schauer, Categories, supra note 17, at 283-86.
56 Schauer, Architecture, supra note 1, at 1198-99.
57 Id at 1199.
58 Id at 1198-99.
59 Id at 1199-200; see also Frederick Schauer, Slippery Slopes, 99 HAgv.L. REv. 361,
376-77 (1985).
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also threatens to erode the "ruleness" and the "learnability" of the
First Amendment.6"
These latter concerns are related, and require some elaboration.
Professor Schauer reminds us that we depend on a wide range of soci61
etal actors to implement our system of freedom of expression.
Speech is dangerous and costly if it will get you arrested by the nearby
police officer; this is true even if no resulting prosecution would be
upheld by the courts. The more complex are the legal rules that protect freedom of expression, the more difficult it will be for these many
actors to learn them and apply them properly. This is true at both a
"global" and a "local" level.
Most globally, a highly reticulated system of freedom of expression-one with lots of subcategories of speech governed by different
rules of protection-will be much less easily understood and assimilated by the many citizens who play a role in the system:
Thus, any increase in doctrinal complexity increases as well the risk
that the non-legally trained front line soldiers in the defense of the
important first amendment will think and react initially in accordance with their personal preconvictions rather than in accordance
with what the doctrine commands. The more complex the doctrine
like
becomes, the more likely it is to be incomprehensible to people
62
this, and if it is incomprehensible it might as well not exist.
Complexity in a particular doctrine also takes a toll. In the case of
workplace harassment, the actual freedom of workplace speech depends not only on judges but on employers, lawyers for potential
plaintiffs and defendants, and to some extent even individual complainants; it depends not only on the actual doctrine governing actionable harassment but on what each of these actors believes to be
actionable harassment. If the constitutional restrictions on harassment law are complex (or vague) and hard to understand and apply,
then complainants and their lawyers will bring lawsuits based on
speech that should be protected, and employers and the lawyers who
advise them will suppress speech that should be protected in order to
avoid litigation as well as liability.
Subcategorization thus raises a variety of concerns, some of them
grounded in the deep theory of the First Amendment and some of
them "architectural" in nature. These concerns support the existence

60 See Schauer, Categories, supra note 17, at 305-07.
61 Schauer, Architecture, supra note 1, at 1200.
62 Id.
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of "a presumption, albeit rebuttable, against the creation of subcat63
egories within the first amendment."
But failing to create a subcategory of speech that, for the most
part, is far from the core (or cores) of the First Amendment poses
architectural risks of its own. If we were to bring verbal workplace
harassment into the general scope of freedom of expression, without
placing it in a separate subcategory, such speech would then be subject to the rigorously protective rules applicable at the center of free
speech doctrine, and in particular the hostility to content-based distinctions. Cohen v. California would preclude consideration of the
offensive manner of expression; Brandenburg v. Ohio3 5 would protect
the advocacy of violence or other harm unless it constituted incitement to imminent harmful conduct; obscenity doctrine would require
the toleration of pervasive and disgusting displays of pornography that
6
did not meet the strict test for obscenity; indeed, RA.V v. St. Paul
would arguably protect even incitement, threats, fighting words, and
obscenity against selective punishment based on the discriminatory
viewpoint expressed by these speech acts. 67 To insist on the application of these "hard core" free speech doctrines to workplace harassment would eviscerate harassment doctrine, allowing the most
intransigently racist and sexist employers and employees to effectively
exclude women or minorities from their workplaces, even without engaging in economic discrimination, by making them intolerable to women and minorities.
Perhaps this was what motivated the R.A.V majority to reach out
in dicta to "save" harassment doctrine from the otherwise fatal implications of the R.A.V analysis. Recall that Title VII's harassment law
was shielded from the effect of BA. V by a new rule: "a particular content-based subcategory of a proscribable class of speech can be swept
up incidentally within the reach of a statute directed at conduct rather
than speech. '68 This dictum may serve to illustrate the risk of "doctrinal dilution" that may attend the failure to recognize discrete subcategories of speech that is, as a class, quite remote from the core
concerns of the First Amendment. Let me explain.
63 Schauer, Categories, supra note 17, at 296.
64 403 U.S. 15 (1971).
65 395 U.S. 444 (1969) (per curiam).
66 505 U.S. 377 (1992).
67 I say this, notwithstanding the dicta purporting to distinguish Title VII's harassment law from the ordinance struck down in RA.V., because the terse analysis put
forward in that dicta has been roundly criticized, and appears inconsistent with much
First Amendment doctrine. See infra notes 68-70 and accompanying text.
68 RA.V., 505 U.S. at 389.
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The real harms and minimal value of most discriminatory verbal
workplace harassment may have led the majority to look for a way to
allow speech regulation in this context. Rather than recognize a discrete subcategory of workplace speech or verbal workplace harassment subject to different rules of protection, the majority articulated a
general limitation on free speech protections-the permissibility of
"incidental" restrictions on some speech under a statute proscribing
conduct-that would permit regulation of some discriminatory verbal
harassment under Title VII. Yet this limitation, if actually extended to
First Amendment analysis generally, would overturn seemingly established protections at the core of free speech doctrine. For example,
as Professor Fallon has pointed out, "[a]s a doctrinal matter, the argument that elevated First Amendment scrutiny should not apply to restrictions on expression arising from general prohibitions against
harmful conduct is flatly rejected by one of the foundational cases of
modem free speech doctrine, United States v. O'Bien.'69 O'Brien held
that the application of such a general prohibition to expression trig70
gered at least elevated if not "strict" scrutiny.
It seems unlikely that the Court would accept the broader implications of the RA. V dicta. But the impulse that seems to have produced that dicta-the desire to permit regulation of speech that
causes real and immediate harms-illustrates the risk of "doctrinal dilution" that may be posed by the attempt to avoid subcategorization.
Subcategorization may sometimes be the architecturally-sound response to a class of speech, most of which is quite remote from the
core concerns of the First Amendment and much of which poses a
real threat-not speculative or diffuse, but immediate and particularized-to strong competing interests.
This brings us to a recurrent problem of free speech theory:
when and how to consider competing interests. Even the most highly
valued forms of political speech are subject to suppression in the face
of sufficiently compelling governmental interests. On the other hand,
any meaningful free speech principles will often require the sacrifice
of real and legitimate competing interests; speech is often protected
even where it causes real harm. 7' To determine whether and to what
69 Fallon, supra note 11, at 15.
70 United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968).
71 This does not mean that the harms caused by speech protection must necessarily be absorbed by the immediate victims of the harmful speech: "If free speech benefits us all, then ideally we all ought to pay for it, not only those who are the victims of
harmful speech." Frederick Schauer, UncouplingFree Speech, 92 COLUM. L. REv. 1321,
1322 (1992). Professor Schauer considers briefly what that might mean in the context of hate speech and pornography, the burden of which is borne very dispropor-
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extent that is called for here would take us far beyond the realm of
architectural principles.
But attention to architecture suggests a derivative consideration
alongside the fundamental normative question: where the society is
deeply enough committed to redressing or avoiding the harms caused
by speech that is at the margins of free expression, there will be great
pressure to accommodate the competing values and to allow the suppression of speech. That accommodation will require either the "dilution" of the protection afforded to core speech or the recognition of a
discrete subcategory of speech within which regulation may be permitted under less exacting standards. Sometimes recognizing a less-protected subcategory of speech helps to maintain the integrity of the
72
core.
This is obviously a perilous line of argument. The First Amendment and the special constitutional status of speech would mean very
little if the mere fact of societal condemnation of speech were enough
to justify weaker protections for that speech. There must be some independent substantive judgment-one that is consistent with fundamental First Amendment principles-that a particular class of speech
is sufficiently low in value and distant from the core or cores of freedom of expression to justify its relegation to a disfavored category.
I will simply assert here what I argue at length elsewhere: 73 a
proper understanding of the role of the workplace in a democratic
society and of workplace speech in public discourse militates in favor
of allowing greater, but not unlimited, regulation of discriminatory
workplace speech. In other words, such speech should be covered by
the First Amendment, but not fully protected. Ideally that requires
the creation of a discrete subcategory of speech that is within the
scope but not the core of the First Amendment.
Architectural principles play only a very limited role in making
that substantive judgment, though the structural preference for a "defining out" approach suggests that the burden ofjustification should
be on the proponent of a separate subcategory. But the architectural
perspective does teach that the substantive judgment in favor of less
protection, while necessary, is not sufficient to justify the-creation of a
tionately by racial minorities and women, groups that bear their share of
discriminatory burdens already. Id. at 1354-55. But apart from general references to
"compensatory responses" and "creativity in thinking about appropriate responses" to
speech of this sort, Professor Schauer does not elaborate much on how we might shift
to the society as a whole the burdens imposed by constitutionally protected discriminatory speech.
72 Schauer, Architecture, supra note 1, at 1194-201.
73 See Estlund, supra note 7.
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separate doctrinal subcategory. We must still ask whether it is possible
to define a subcategory that does not create an unacceptable risk of
error, and that is not too vague or complex for the relevant actors to
apply in a reasonably predictable way.74 We must also ask whether the
creation of a subcategory in this particular corner of free speech doctrine will contribute to the increasing complexity of the First Amendment and the erosion of its "ruleness." And we must ask whether any
structural concerns we have about subcategorization outweigh the
competing structural threat of doctrinal dilution, given the societal
pressure for regulation that we have now determined is substantively
justified.
How do these architectural concerns play out in the realm of verbal workplace harassment? Recall some of the arguments that were
considered in support of excluding workplace harassment from the
realm of the First Amendment entirely: the relative ease with which
the category of verbal workplace harassment can be identified, contained, and insulated from the core of public discourse, particularly in
light of the physical location of such speech in the workplace. The
idea that speech in the workplace is different and more restricted
than speech in mass media or in the public square hardly needs to be
taught, for it resonates with the widely-shared experience of ordinary
people. Moreover, it is individual complainants and not the government that initially identify speech as harassment and seek legal sanctions against it.75 This makes harassment law less like censorship and
more like, for example, defamation law. Finally, the reasons for creating a subcategory of verbal workplace harassment-combating discrimination on the basis of race and sex in conditions of
employment-are not inconsistent with the basic premises of the First
76
Amendment.
74 See Schauer, Categories, supra note 17, at 295-96.
75 This is true to the extent that we are discussing harassment law and not the
anti-harassment policies of government employers. Even in the latter case, it is injury
or offense to individual employees that triggers application of these policies. This
does not render the First Amendment irrelevant by any means, but it distinguishes
regulation of harassment from regulation of speech based on its alleged harm to the
government, to government officials, to the general public, or to public morality. The
government ought to have-and I believe has-greater latitude to protect individuals
from particularized harms than it has to protect itself or the public at large. This
proposition raises a host of issues that I will leave unexamined in the present context.
76 That is not to say that some applications of harassment law are not inconsistent
with those premises. But in this respect, harassment law is like defamation law: the
basic goal of defamation law-the reason for treating "defamation" as a separate subcategory of speech-is not inconsistent with the premises of free speech protection;
but some applications, such as that struck down in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376
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These considerations did not justify the complete exclusion of
verbal workplace harassment from the realm of "speech"; they were
outweighed by the value of some of the speech in question. But those
same considerations do support the less extreme measure of placing
verbal workplace harassment in a separate and less protected category
within the realm of the First Amendment. For the remaining alternative to subcategorization-"full protection" of this speech-would
force decisionmakers to choose between, on the one hand, sacrificing
the very strong interests protected by this branch of antidiscrimination law, and, on the other hand, lowering the general barriers to
speech regulation to accommodate those strong competing interests.
V
Once having decided to "build a separate room" within First
Amendment law for verbal workplace harassment, we have to design
the room itself: what must be shown to justify the suppression of verbal workplace harassment? More precisely, what must be shown to
justify a court's relying in part on speech to establish the existence of a
discriminatory hostile environment?77 For in the private sector it is
the judicial imposition of civil liability on the basis in part of workplace speech that constitutes state action and brings this issue into the
purview of constitutional law. And it is the prospect of liability that
leads plaintiffs to file lawsuits and contributes to employers' incentive
to suppress the speech of their employees. (Fear of liability is not the
only incentive to suppress discriminatory speech in the private sector
workplace, but it is the only incentive that raises a constitutional
issue.)
Again, we are faced with the question whether to "define in" or
"define out": within the now-discrete subcategory of verbal workplace
harassment-speech that allegedly contributes to a hostile environment-should we devise a standard that the opponents of regulation
must meet to justify protection, or should we instead set a standard
that proponents of regulation must meet to justify regulation? The
stakes in this choice are lower here, where we are operating within a
less-protected subcategory of speech, than they are in the fundamental choice of whether to exclude speech from the realm of the First
U.S. 254 (1964), are inconsistent with the First Amendment. The task of identifying
which applications are permissible and which are not is left to the next stage of analysis: what are the rules or standards of protection within the subcategory?
77 I am putting aside the parallel but distinct question of what a government employer must show to support a workplace harassment policy that prohibits speech. See
supra note 47.
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Amendment altogether, or even in the secondary choice of whether to
create a separate subcategory of less-protected speech. And indeed,
the doctrine that governs within discrete categories of speech affords
examples of both "defining in" and "defining out" approaches, as well
78
as approaches that combine both.
One can imagine a combined test in the harassment context.
First, the defendant must show, for example, that some of the speech
in question constitutes a statement of opinion or belief on a matter of
public concern. Then the plaintiff, in order to rely on a statement of
that nature as part of her hostile environment claim, would have to
show that the statement was intentionally directed at her, with the
knowledge that she was offended, on the basis of her sex or race; or
that the statement was intended to drive the plaintiff from the workplace; or that it was grossly and knowingly offensive on the basis of
race or sex and was uttered at a time, place, and manner that was not
reasonably avoidable by employees who were thus offended. The standard would create a limited safe harbor for workplace speech in the
harassment context: speech within a limited, highly-valued, contentbased class would be subject to liability only if it was made in a manner
that was deemed particularly likely to be harmful.
Every element of this hypothetical standard would have to be
tested against the underlying substantive analysis of the harms and
values of various kinds of alleged verbal workplace harassment. That
is not my objective here. But I want to highlight some critical architectural aspects of this standard. First, the test puts enormous pressure on the decision whether a given utterance was on a "matter of
public concern." This is an increasingly common formulation of the
traditional core of free speech that contributes to democratic self-governance. Do we want a First Amendment standard that requires
judges-and by extension lawyers, employers, prospective plaintiffs,
78 For example, New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964), in one stroke,
brought defamation into the realm of the First Amendment, placed it in a separate
subcategory, and set up a First Amendment standard the first step of which was the
defendant's showing that the plaintiff, the subject of the alleged defamation, was a
public official. As the doctrine now stands, alleged libel that is directed against public
officials or other public figures, or that bears on matters of public concern, is protected unless the plaintiff goes on to show that the utterance was false and was made
with knowledge of its falsity or reckless disregard for the truth. See also Philadelphia
Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps, 475 U.S. 767 (1986); Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss
Builders, 472 U.S. 749 (1985); Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
Within the subcategory of allegedly defamatory speech, then, the doctrine begins with
a threshold "defining-in" requirement that the defendant, or opponent of regulation,
must meet; within this "defined-in" class of alleged libel, liability turns on a "definingout" standard that must be met by the plaintiff.
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and other employees-to decide in case after case whether a particular matter is or is not of public concern? Such a standard seems to
present a high risk of errors in judgment-errors that matter a great
deal because they cut into the core of freedom of speech2 9 Indeed,
entrusting courts with that judgment seems to invade the province of
the public itself in a free society.8 0 The "public concern" threshold
poses in especially acute form the risks that attend the "defining-in"
approach generally, though the risks are muted in the context of a
discrete, less-protected subcategory.
Of course libel law and public employee speech doctrine pose
these very same risks, for in each of those areas it is only speech on
matters of public concern (and, in the case of libel, speech about pub8
lic figures) that triggers any special First Amendment protections. '
In both areas the public concern limitation is the doctrinal linchpin
of an effort to balance free speech interests against competing interests that are thought normally to be more powerful. Is this device any
82
less defensible in the workplace harassment context? Perhaps not.
But the comparison begs a prior question of whether the public concern limitation in these other areas is defensible. As that question
would take me far afield, let me simply suggest that basic architectural
principles should lead us to be extremely wary of any test that requires
the speaker to demonstrate that her speech is on a matter of public
concern. 8 We should look for another way to strike a fair balance
among competing interests.
One obvious alternative is to remove the initial "defining-in" burden on the defendant and revert to a "defining-out" approach. We
might require the plaintiff, whenever she seeks to rely on speech as
79 I develop this argument, with heavy reliance on Professor Schauer's work, in
Cynthia L. Estlund, Speech on Matters of Public Concern: The Perils of a New First Amendment Category, 59 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 1 (1990) [hereinafter Estlund, Public Concern].
80 See Robert Post, The ConstitutionalConcept ofPublicDiscourse: Outrageous Opinion,
DemocraticDeliberation, and Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 103 HAv. L. REv. 601 1990).

81 See Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138 (1983) (holding that public employee
speech is only protected against employer action where it is on a matter of public
concern); see also Dun & Bradstreet 472 U.S. at 749; Gertz, 418 U.S. at 323.
82 On the other hand, the use of the public concern limitation in public employee speech doctrine should not be viewed as persuasive precedent for its use in this
context; even if the limitation is justified in that context, its justification is not transportable to the workplace harassment context. The government's power as employer
over the speech of its employees is based on its managerial interests in workplace
efficiency; those interests do not support the government's power to regulate speech
in private and public workplaces across the country. See Estlund, supra note 7, at
711-14.
83 I have explored that question in Estlund, Public Concern, supra note 79.
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part of her hostile environment claim, to show either that the statement was of a traditionally unprotected type of speech; or that the
speech was directed at her, with the knowledge that she was offended,
on the basis of her sex or race; or that the speech was intended to
drive her from the workplace; or that the manner of expression was
grossly and knowingly offensive on the basis of race or sex and uttered
at a time, place, and manner that the plaintiff could not reasonably
avoid. A test of this sort would place no viewpoints and no subjects off
limits, or entirely beyond the range of protection, in the workplace; it
would instead impose civility constraints-in some respects contentbased civility constraints-on the time, place, and manner of expression. Without purporting to review in detail the merits of each of
these tests, I want to flag some common structural issues.
The primary virtue of this approach is its avoidance of the content-based threshold test; it would effectively protect speech on a
broad range of topics-politics, social and moral issues, personal matters, religion-as long as such speech was not made in a particular
injurious manner. This is a particularly significant virtue if one believes as I do that speech on this whole range of issues contributes
importantly to workplace discourse and helps to make the workplace a
particularly valuable forum for speech within the system of freedom of
expression. 8 4 This approach would also avoid the unsettling spectacle
of courts adjudicating the boundaries of legitimate public concern in
case after case.
But this new test, and in fact any test that turns largely or wholly
on the manner of expression, is also subject to serious objections.
Tests like those suggested above, which require proof of knowledge or
intent on the part of the speaker, would place a difficult burden on
the plaintiff whose case turned importantly on speech, and especially
undirected speech. In particular, a test that requires that speech be
directed at a particular listener whom the speaker knows to be offended would allow the saturation of the workplace with grossly racist
and sexist slogans, pornographic posters, and taunts, as long as they
are not targeted at any individual.
Yet a test that turned entirely on "offensiveness," or the response
of offended listeners, and that required no proof of knowledge or in85
tent on the part of the speaker, would raise serious problems as well.
84 See Estlund, supra note 7, at 746-48.
85 The subcategory of "offensive" speech generally is one of those categories that
Professor Schauer has most harshly criticized on grounds of vagueness, risk of error,
and inconsistency with the theoretical premises of the First Amendment. See Schauer,
Categories, supra note 17, at 292-95. Even if regulation turns on the offensiveness of
the manner of expression rather than the ideas expressed, those objections remain
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Such a test would likely lead the liability-averse employer to enforce
broad harassment policies keyed to the most sensitive and easily-offended listener in the workplace. Whether or not such a test would
advance workplace equality-and this is far from obvious-it would
allow harassment doctrine to act as a powerful inducement to censorship in the workplace.
This is not the place to resolve the dilemma. That would require
a deeper analysis of the nature of workplace harassment and the value
of workplace speech in the system of freedom of expression. 86 But
any such analysis should continue to attend to the architectural concerns elucidated by Professor Schauer.
VI
We have now seen the many perils that face us once we bring
workplace harassment into the realm of the First Amendment. Most
importantly, we cannot escape the dilemma posed by the competing
risks of doctrinal dilution on the one hand and excessive subcategorization and complexity on the other. I have concluded that the
best resolution of this dilemma is to create a subcategory of verbal
workplace harassment within the realm of the First Amendment; I
have argued that the risks that accompany any decision to subdivide
speech are tolerable in this context. But the risks are still present. Do
the gains for freedom of expression in the workplace justify these risks
to the integrity of First Amendment doctrine?
These architectural risks are normally ignored in the analysis of
workplace harassment law, as they are ignored in the analysis of innumerable other particular First Amendment problems, because they
very potent. See id. at 293-94. While I take those concerns very much to heart, I find
(in my more extended treatment of the issue, Estlund, supra note 7, at 750-52) that
offensiveness is an inescapable element of harassment law, and that the concerns underlying harassment law justify the reliance on the manifestly offensive manner of
expression in some circumstances-that is, where the speech is uttered at a time and
place that is not reasonably avoidable by a listener or viewer who is offended. This
would be an extremely problematic limitation on speech protections in the core of
public discourse. But the regulation of speech partly on the basis of its offensiveness
within a soundly-defined subcategory of verbal workplace harassment is different, and
less troubling, than the creation of a subcategory of offensive speech. The precise
virtue of creating subcategories of speech-here, the less problematic subcategory of
verbal workplace harassment-is to permit some distinctions that would be impermissible in the realm of "full protection." While I would not contend that "anything
goes" within a well-conceived subcategory of speech, I do conclude that reliance on
the offensive manner (and unavoidable time and place) of expression is constitutionally appropriate in the realm of workplace harassment.
86 See infra note 87.
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take their toll not on the law of workplace harassment or even the law
of workplace speech, but in the structural integrity of the First Amendment as a whole. In other words, too often First Amendment arguments proceed "beam by beam, pillar by pillar, and brick by brick,"
without sufficient attention to the overall shape and strength of the
structure we are building.
With respect to the problem of verbal workplace harassment, I
must again resort to bare assertion: I believe that the gains for workplace expression do outweigh the architectural risks, as well as the
potential barriers to victims of harassment, that are posed by introducing the First Amendment into this arena. In part this judgment may
be based on the seeming inevitability of both some form of First
Amendment intervention (in light of RA. V and the flood of academic commentary) and a lower level of protection than exists in the
core of free speech. Recognition of a less-protected subcategory of
"verbal workplace harassment" seems, on balance, to be the architecturally sound response to this intensely difficult problem. But this resolution, inevitable or not, is also right: bringing the First Amendment
into this area of law provides a much-needed affirmation that workplace speech is important enough to warrant constitutional attention
and protection; yet the particular nature of the workplace requires us
to calibrate the level of First Amendment protections of speech in that
87
setting.
87 My basis for these assertions, which cannot be formulated in architectural
terms, is explicated at (excessive) length in Estlund, supranote 7. In short, I outline a
conception of the workplace as a "satellite domain" of public discourse-a domain
that lies outside of the core of public discourse but that contributes to that discourse
in unique and important ways. I begin by observing that the workplace is at the same
time an object of societal governance and a self-governing institution with sometimes
elaborate and sometimes participatory structures of internal governance. Freedom of
expression at work can promote the ability of citizens to form and exchange opinions,
beliefs, and information about how the workplace is regulated, and to gain experience with participation in governance. In addition, and most importantly in the context of workplace harassment, the workplace is a crucial intermediate institution in
society-an institution in which individuals relate and cooperate with their fellow citizens outside the intimate bonds of family and friendship. The workplace is not the
sort of voluntary association that mediates between the individual and society by affording a constitutionally-protected refuge from societal norms or a haven of shared
values in a diverse society. Title VII, by prohibiting exclusion, segregation, and discrimination on the basis of race, sex, religion, nationality, and the like, constitutes the
workplace as a different sort of intermediate institution in which unrelated individuals from diverse backgrounds interact and cooperate in support of shared instrumental ends, within the constraints of the antidiscrimination principle. The workplace
functions ideally as a kind of laboratory of diversity in which the laws of democratic
engagement can be learned and practiced.
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Architectural principles alone do not lead us to this resolution or
to another. Indeed, at times it may seem that for every architectural
principle that points in one direction-for example, against subcategorization-there is an opposing architectural principle that points
in another direction. But in the final analysis, I find that these architectural principles have real bite. They do not produce simple answers, but they direct our attention to a whole set of issues that are
often ignored.
For me, Professor Schauer's architectural lessons have been
among the most useful contributions to the whole sprawling body of
First Amendment scholarship. For he has reminded us that, in constructing every wall, closet, nook, and cranny of free speech doctrine,
we are also contributing to-or potentially weakening-the great edifice of the First Amendment.

Because of this unusual convergence of diversity and dose, ongoing, purposive
interaction under an antidiscrimination norm, freedom of expression within the
workplace can make a unique contribution to public discourse. At the same time,
however, unconstrained speech among coworkers who are forced into daily proximity
could destroy the possibility of constructive engagement. What Professor Robert Post
calls the "paradox of public discourse," see ROBERT C. POST, CONSTrrUTIONAL DOMAINS

119-78 (1995), thus recurs within the workplace, but in a different form that calls for
a different resolution. I argue that constraints on free expression in support of workplace equality can and should be given greater scope in the workplace than in the
society at large because it is workplace diversity, as enforced by the equality norm, that
renders the workplace a uniquely valuable forum for speech and an important satellite forum for public discourse. Reasonable civility constraints on employee freedom
of expression are necessary to reinforce the norms of tolerance that hold together the
workplace community within which a conversation is meaningful. An understanding
of the nature of the workplace thus offers grounds for a principled compromise between the conflicting imperatives of freedom and constraint; a compromise that recognizes the unique capacity of workplace discourse to contribute to public discourse
within a democracy.

